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Introduction
DARPA has supported research in formal verification for many years (see MacKenzie's book for an interesting history of how ARPA helped get this field started in the 1960s and 70s [MacKenzie 2001] ). But formal verification has sometimes been criticized for a long list of shortcomings: it's too expensive to do; people don't verify the actual engineered systems but just simplistic abstractions of the real world; formal proofs of real systems are too big to check for errors; and so on. These criticisms cannot be lightly dismissed.
What we set out to do in our DARPA-supported research was to apply formal verification in settings that can address these criticisms directly.
We chose two main problem domains: Language-based security for virtual machines, and distributed authentication frameworks. For each problem domain, I'll explain what is the problem that motivates the need for formal verification, why it seemed that formal methods might actually be useful in this domain, and what solutions we engineered.
Language-based security for virtual machines
Component-software platforms such as Sun's Java and Microsoft's .Net are increasingly used by commercial software developers because they provide many advantages over conventional development (in languages such as C and C++). Commonly accepted software-engineering practices such as data encapsulation (information hiding) are enforceable on these platforms, in contrast to C/C++ where careless programmers can bypass information-hiding rules. This brings many benefits: software development is quicker and software is more reliable. There are important security benefits as well: Java programs 1 are basically immune to buffer-overrun vulnerabilities, which is the most common path that attackers use to subvert software on the Internet today.
Because modern programming languages such as Java provide better support for reusable components than previous-generation languages, commercial developers often build their software from a combination of off-the-shelf and custom-built components. Often the off-the-shelf components are obtained from other parties. This leads to many efficiencies in building lower-cost and more reliable software; but it can lead to security worries. If you install software on your mission-critical system, you want to be sure that it does not have Trojan horses that will steal or corrupt your data. The people who write the software pose an "insider threat," but with contemporary component-software integration practices, there's a very wide set of "insiders" to consider. 1 Almost everything I will say about Java applies as well to Microsoft's C# (pronounced C-sharp) language. The Java language is used to write programs that run on the Java Virtual Machine (JVM); the C# language is used to write programs that run on the Common Language Runtime (CLR) of Microsoft's .Net platform. JVM and CLR can run on conventional operating systems such as Linux and Windows; JVM can also run directly on embedded devices such as smart cards and cell phones.
A conventional (and very reasonable) solution to this problem is to use protection mechanisms so that less-trusted software components have limited access to sensitive data. In the past, when each component was an entire software application that ran in its own address space, we could use virtual memory, jointly implemented by the hardware and the operating system, as such a protection mechanism.
But virtual memory will not work well as a protection mechanism for Java components, because the more-trusted and less-trusted components all share the same address space and the same operating-system process. There are some very good reasons that components share an address space: it allows the interaction between components to use expressive and efficient object-oriented interfaces, instead of clumsy and slow remote procedure calls and message passing. Therefore virtual memory cannot serve as the protection mechanism.
Java has a built-in protection mechanism: its type-checker. Java's type system enforces, in the source code, fine grain access control by software components. Objects of one class cannot read or write the private fields of objects from other classes. Java source code is compiled to byte-codes (called "Java Virtual Machine Language", or JVML, but I will just use "byte-codes"), and it is the byte-codes that are shipped and installed on users' JVMs, but the byte-codes are also type-checkable by the byte-code verifier built into the JVM. In principle, the language-based protection built into Java can allow software to be built from a combination of less-trusted and more-trusted components, so that less-trusted components have limited access to data owned by more-trusted components.
But there's a big problem with language-based protection in conventional virtual machines for Java and C#. What if the protection mechanism has holes in it? That is, what if bugs in the implementation of the virtual machine allow the less-trusted programmers of less-trusted components to bypass the protection and access private fields of more-trusted components? To assess this problem, we examine what parts of a Java Virtual Machine are in the "trusted base" of the protection mechanism. The trusted base of a system is the part in which bugs could cause security vulnerabilities. We find [31] that the trusted base of a conventional JVM is huge, comprising hundreds of thousands of lines of code. One of the biggest problems is that the JVM contains a justin-time (JIT) compiler that translates byte-codes to native machine code (e.g., Intel Pentium machine language); the JIT compiler is well over a hundred thousand of lines long in a high-tech JVM, and, as I will describe, a bug in the JIT could be exploited to breach the protection mechanism. It's not realistically possible to write 100,000 lines of code with no bugs at all, so we cannot rely on this protection mechanism.
A correct JIT compiler guarantees that well-typed byte code will compile to machine code that respects its interfaces; that is, the machine code output from the JIT will not access private fields of other objects. Bugs in the JIT compiler can be exploited by software components that run on the JVM platform, as follows. Consider an attacker who is providing one of the less-trusted components of a large component-software system written in Java. Normally, the program he writes will never be given access to private data. However, suppose the unscrupulous programmer learns of a bug in the JIT compiler that causes well-typed byte-code to be (incorrectly) compiled to machine code that does not respect its interfaces. He writes the Java source code for his component to trigger this bug. The component he supplies is now able to bypass the protection mechanism. This is a pity, because Java's object-oriented interfaces and language-based security lead to significant productivity and reliability improvements in software development, and if only we could rely on its language-based protection mechanism, we could build moresecure systems from reusable software components.
Research goal and approach
Thus we arrive at one of the goals of our DARPA-funded research project: design and prototype an architecture in which the language-based protection mechanism is provided by a JIT compiler, in such a way that the protection mechanism can be formally verified. The formal verification itself should be believable, that is, it should be mechanically checkable using a substantially smaller trusted base than the software being verified; and the verification should be of the actual software that is installed in some prototype system.
We had several reasons to believe that this problem could be successfully approached using formal verification, using the right approach. A brute-force approach would be to formally verify all the Java code that is sent to the JVM; but this would be impossible, because there's so much of it, and it's written by programmers who don't have the time or the expertise to do the verification. A slightly less impossible approach would be to verify the correctness of the JIT compiler; then just one formal verification (of the compiler) could be leveraged to guarantee safety properties of all the unverified, untrusted components that are compiled through it. But still, the compiler is too large for current formal-methods techniques to work well.
The approach we take is therefore proof-carrying code: we have the JIT compiler emit, along with the native machine code, evidence that the code is safe to execute (i.e., that it respects the security policy). The evidence is independently checked (and compared with the code). If the evidence doesn't check out, or fails to correspond to the code, then the code is rejected and is not installed.
This crucially relies on a sound logical system for checking the evidence. Soundness means, "if the checker accepts the evidence for the claim, then the claim is true." An important part of our research has been to demonstrate the soundness of our system. This setup can safely tolerate bugs in the JIT compiler. A bug may cause the code to be unsafe, in which case it will be impossible to produce evidence that the checker will accept; or a bug may cause the evidence-generator to provide bad evidence, in which case the code will also be rejected. In the worst case, a bug may cause the compiler to produce incorrect but safe output (machine code that doesn't work right, but at least obeys the security policy). In this case, it is possible that the evidence would check and that the code could be installed and executed.
Architecture of our design
The major components of our solution are as follows. We start with a program in a typesafe source language; the languages we have prototyped include ML and Java.
• Framework, type systems, and algorithms for propagating type-checking information from the front end of the compiler (Java or ML source code) to the middle of the compiler (intermediate language(s) A formal proof that if the "evidence" is accepted by the checker, then the corresponding machine code must obey the safety property. This is one of the major novel results of our research; no previous proof-carrying code system had such a proof. Because the proof is so large, it must be checked by machine. Thus, this part of the research involves both the underlying mathematics of why soundness holds, and also the techniques for representing this mathematics in a machine-checkable system. [3, 4, 5, 7, 12, 14, 17, 18, 20, 36, 45, 50, 56, 58] • Design and implementation of the independent checker itself. This checker checks two things: (1) the soundness proof for the evidence language, and (2) the evidence for safety of a particular program. This checker is the "trusted base" of the entire system; if (and only if) it is correct, then the whole system can guarantee enforcement of the protection mechanism. Therefore it's very important that the checker itself be small and simple enough that it can be implemented correctly. Our checker is small and simple: it's about 1,100 lines of C code. [30, 54] We can make quantitative measurements of various components. The SML/NJ compiler from ML source code to Sparc machine language is approximately 90 kloc (thousand lines of code). Thus, for a conventional compiler the implementation effort (where smaller is better) was 90 kloc, and the trusted base (where smaller is better) was also 90 kloc.
Our new proof-carrying-code version of the SML/NJ compiler is approximately 114 kloc; that is; approximately 24 kloc is devoted to producing the "evidence" for the checker. The specification of the "evidence language" is 5 kloc, and the soundness proof is about 134 kloc. Thus, there is a total of 253 kloc of untrusted code; that is, a bug in any part of that code would not lead to a vulnerability, because if it caused unsafety it would be caught by the checker. We have a trusted base of 3 kloc: the specification of the safety policy and Sparc machine architecture is 1.8 kloc, and the checker is 1.1 kloc.
Overall, the project has been successful, not only at demonstrating the applicability of mechanized formal verification to the assurance of protection mechanisms in virtual machines, but also to the measurement of how large a task it is. What we find is that, in this case, formal verification reduces the trusted base by a factor of approximately 30, and increases the development effort by a factor of approximately 3.
Increasing the development effort by a factor of 3 is not a tradeoff to make lightly. We argue that for a highly leveraged piece of software (such as the virtual machine that is used as platform for many application modules) the investment may be worthwhile.
Other investigations in language-based security
In addition to the Foundational Proof-Carrying Code project described in the previous subsection, we also investigated how a wider class of security policies could be expressed using techniques that go beyond ordinary type checking. We have found a variety of static techniques (that can analyze programs before they execute) [12, 39, 48, 59 ] and dynamic techniques (that monitor programs as they execute) [32, 49] .
We also performed an experiment to question the very assumptions on which proofcarrying code (and language-based security) is based. Our soundness proof relies upon the assumption that the computer actually executes its specified instruction set. What if the attacker tried to exploit the fact that sometimes this is not the case? In particular, it is known that machines sometimes have transient memory errors: a bit in memory will change its value, perhaps because a cosmic ray passes through the memory chip. This invalidates our assumption; the question is, could an attacker actually take advantage of this to breach confidentiality and integrity of protected data? We show that the answer is yes [35] ; one can design a Java program that takes advantage of random memory errors to defeat the language-based protection. However, we also show that conventional hardware techniques (parity, or single-error-correction-double-error-detection) are adequate to restore the protection guarantee.
We have continued investigations into whether hardware errors could compromise in other ways the assumptions under which language-based security operates. For example, we have tried attacks suggested by recent research on the susceptibility of processors to software-induced voltage swings [Joseph 2003 ]. We have found that modern commercial microprocessors are robust against such attacks. Overall, our conclusion is that languagebased security is robust with respect to the assumption that the computer hardware executes its instruction set as specified, but that this issue should not be ignored.
Proof-carrying authentication and access control
Access control is a nontrivial problem even in a single-host system. One must authenticate the users (that is, determine whether they are who they say they are) and then determine whether those users have permission to read (or write, etc.) the given data. But in a distributed setting, the problem is much more complicated. There are many different owners of data, each of which must make access-control decisions for many different (overlapping) groups of users. Different data-owners may have different policies; in fact, they may have different languages for expressing policies. Some parties to the system play specialized roles such as certifying the association of authentication keys to users.
Previous work on distributed authentication logics [Lampson 1992 ] and on public-key infrastructures [Housley 2002 , Ellison 1999 ] has given us a useful framework for thinking about the problem, but each of these works assumes that there is just one language for expressing policies-and, of course, each work has its own different idea of what that language should be.
A distributed authentication framework
The problem we set out to solve is this: build a framework for specifying and implementing languages for distributed authentication/authorization frameworks, so that different languages (even ones yet to be invented) can interoperate soundly, and so that expressive languages can be designed for application-specific purposes.
The approach we take is this: for each policy language, define its operators using formal logic. (The user of the language won't have to see the formal logic.) Then use these definitions to prove the soundness of each policy language individually. Because each language is definitionally specified in the same underlying logic, they can then soundly interoperate, not only with each other, but with policy languages yet to be invented. [2, 13] Our system relies on machine-checked formal proof, just as our proof-carrying code system does. We use the same logical infrastructure as in PCC, and the same proofdevelopment tools. In fact, the same (small and simple) independent checker that we used for PCC can also be used for proof-carrying authentication.
We built the framework, and to demonstrate its effectiveness we used it to implement a distributed access-control policy language. The prototype language has features such as certificates, local names, general delegation, specific delegation, and time-dependent policies. We show how it can be easily extended to do expiration, key management and revocation, abstract principals, and delegation across domains.
We interfaced our implementation to the Apache web server and to a proxy web client, and we showed that it is useful in practice in fine-grain access control to web pages on the Internet. [60, 37] 
Proof-carrying linking
Another application of proof-carrying authentication is the specification and checking of software component assemblies.
Large software systems are often built from loosely coupled subsystems. When a software integrator uses a third-party software component as a building block in a system, he doesn't want the code he imports to break the whole system. How can he determine that it is safe to link the foreign software component into the system?
The most widely used methods for ensuring safe linking are type checking and code signing. Type-checking can make some very strong guarantees of some security policies-it is the basis of the our PCC research, for example; but we also wanted to explore how code signing could be used in a principled way. Code signing ensures that someone trustworthy trusts the code, but it is not always enough for guaranteeing system safety since trusted software companies or software developers unintentionally make mistakes. Software signed by trusted companies can still cause security holes in users' systems. For example, in November 2002 Microsoft released a badly coded ActiveX control, signed (as usual) with Microsoft's code-signing key; the bug led to a security vulnerability. Because Microsoft's code-signing protocol is insufficiently expressive, Microsoft was faced with the choice of setting a kill bit so that no browser would run the control-thereby disabling thousands of websites, even ones containing no securitycritical data---or not setting the bit-thereby continuing to endorse the product. Microsoft chose the latter; it recommended that users who desired a secure system should remove Microsoft from Internet Explorer's Trusted Publisher List [Microsoft 2002 ].
We designed and prototyped Secure Linking (SL) [33, 42] , a flexible way of allowing software component users to specify their security policy at link time, giving the users more control than type-checking or traditional digital signing. Our Secure Linking mechanism would not prevent bugs in ActiveX in the previous example, but it would give the software provider and the software consumer finer-grained control of the meaning of certificates they use.
With the SL framework, a code consumer can establish a linking policy to protect itself from malicious code from outside. The policy can include certain properties that the code consumer thinks useful for system safety: software component names, applicationspecific correctness properties, version information of software components, and so on.
To link and to execute a component in a SL-enabled system there must be a machinecheckable proof that the component has the properties specified in the code consumer's linking policy. This proof might be provided by the code provider, or might be produced by an untrusted proving algorithm that runs on the code consumer's machine. The proof is formed using the logic and inference rules of the framework. After being submitted, the proof is checked by a small trusted proof checker in the code consumer, and if verified, the component is allowed to be linked to other components in the code consumer.
Just as our proof-carrying authentication/authorization framework is designed to accommodate many different policy languages, so is our SL framework. We tested this aspect of SL by showing that Microsoft's "package assembly" language, for specifying linking policies in their .Net framework, can be encoded in SL and interoperate with other policy languages.
Information assurance measurement (policy-based network management)
In early 2003, we began a seedling project to investigate whether mechanized logical reasoning could be helpful in dealing with the complexities of network management, with firewalls, routers, server software, CERT advisories, and so on. We have made substantial progress on this effort, leading to a significant research result in November 2004, a few months after the end of the DARPA contract [61] .
To determine the security impact that software vulnerabilities have on a particular network, one must consider interactions among multiple vulnerabilities and multiple hosts. We implanted a tool called MulVAL, an end-to-end framework and reasoning system that conducts multihost, multistage vulnerability analysis on a network. MulVAL is cleanly modularized so that it can effectively leverage existing work on single-host vulnerability recognition and network configuration management. The reasoning engine in MulVAL takes inputs from off-the-shelf tools [Wojcik 2003 ] and performs analysis on the whole network to determine if vulnerabilities found on individual hosts can result in a condition violating a given high-level security policy. MulVAL considers interaction among multiple hosts and multiple vulnerabilities, as well as network and machine configurations that are relevant in attacks. In the wake of a new vulnerability report, MulVAL can quickly tell a system administrator if the new bug breaks the security policy of the network. If so, MulVAL generates an attack trace to help the system administrator decide upon countermeasures.
Technology transfer
Our research can be most useful to DARPA and its clients if our technology can be transitioned into industrially useful tools. We have actively sought avenues for technology transfer.
Our proof-carrying code research shows how to build more-secure, higher-assurance virtual machine platforms for languages such as Java and C#. The natural technology transfer path is to have the commercial builders of such platforms learn how to adopt this technology. Then, as a matter of course, any existing or new Java or C# applications can and will be run on more-secure platforms. For the Java platform, we have collaborated since 2001 with Intel Research, who make open-source Java and .Net research virtual machines. They have been incorporating some of the evidence-generation technology in their JIT compiler. We have also worked informally with researchers at Microsoft who are constructing their next-generation virtual machine for the .Net platform. In fact, the graduate student who built our certifying compiler back end [55] is now working on similar projects at Microsoft research.
The technology transfer for proof-carrying authorization is being done in a different way.
The student who built our PCA system [37] is now a research scientist working on a project led by Michael Reiter at CMU to build PCA into smart cards for a distributed access-control system. This project should demonstrate whether PCA can be successful in demanding circumstances.
We are planning to do technology transfer of policy-based network management based on a collaboration with HP Laboratories. We have been discussing this with them for several months and serious work on a joint project is likely to begin in early 2005.
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